The influence of labour flows on wage drift: an empirical analysis for The Netherlands by Butter, F.A.G. den & Eppink, F.V.
  
PLEASE SCROLL DOWN FOR ARTICLE
This article was downloaded by: [Vrije Universiteit, Library]
On: 30 May 2011
Access details: Access Details: [subscription number 907218003]
Publisher Routledge
Informa Ltd Registered in England and Wales Registered Number: 1072954 Registered office: Mortimer House, 37-
41 Mortimer Street, London W1T 3JH, UK
Applied Economics Letters
Publication details, including instructions for authors and subscription information:
http://www.informaworld.com/smpp/title~content=t713684190
The influence of labour flows on wage drift: an empirical analysis for The
Netherlands
Frank A. G. Den Buttera; Florian V. Eppinka
a Free University, Department of Economics, Applied Labour Economics Research Team (ALERT), De
Boelelaan 1105, 1081 HV Amsterdam, The Netherlands,
Online publication date: 06 October 2010
To cite this Article Butter, Frank A. G. Den and Eppink, Florian V.(2003) 'The influence of labour flows on wage drift: an
empirical analysis for The Netherlands', Applied Economics Letters, 10: 3, 139 — 142
To link to this Article: DOI: 10.1080/1350485022000041069
URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/1350485022000041069
Full terms and conditions of use: http://www.informaworld.com/terms-and-conditions-of-access.pdf
This article may be used for research, teaching and private study purposes. Any substantial or
systematic reproduction, re-distribution, re-selling, loan or sub-licensing, systematic supply or
distribution in any form to anyone is expressly forbidden.
The publisher does not give any warranty express or implied or make any representation that the contents
will be complete or accurate or up to date. The accuracy of any instructions, formulae and drug doses
should be independently verified with primary sources. The publisher shall not be liable for any loss,
actions, claims, proceedings, demand or costs or damages whatsoever or howsoever caused arising directly
or indirectly in connection with or arising out of the use of this material.
The inﬂuence of labour ﬂows on wage drift:
an empirical analysis for The Netherlands
FRANK A. G. DEN BUTTER* and FLORIAN V. EPPINK
Free University, Department of Economics, Applied Labour Economics Research
Team (ALERT), De Boelelaan 1105, 1081 HV Amsterdam, The Netherlands
The wage level in The Netherlands is, by a large part, determined in collective labour
agreements. However, the result of the processes of job destruction, job creation and
job-to-job mobility is that workers move from less productive to more productive
jobs. The empirical analysis shows that the resulting productivity gains are reﬂected
in the wage drift, i.e. wage increases which are not part of the collective agreements.
Yet, the size of the eﬀects appears to be rather modest.
I . INTRODUCTION
Most empirical studies on wage formation in European
countries focus on the outcome of the bargaining processes
between trade unions and employer organizations. The
resulting wage equations explain the determinants of the
collectively agreed wage increases. A major determinant in
these equations reﬂects the relative bargaining power of
both parties and is included into the equations either as a
Phillips-curve or as a wage-curve eﬀect. Most traditional
studies have the unemployment rate, or a transformation
thereof, as an explanatory variable representing the bar-
gaining power, whereas Broersma and Den Butter (2001,
2002) consider data on labour ﬂows as an alternative to
these traditional indicators of tightness on the labour mar-
ket.
However, labour ﬂows will not only have an inﬂuence on
earned wages through bargaining power, but will also
aﬀect the part of wage changes which does not stem from
collective agreements, namely the wage drift. It is likely
that a direct relationship exists between wage formation
and labour market dynamics. Workers move from
destroyed and unproductive old jobs to newly created
and more productive new jobs. The result is that, especially
in the period of a tight labour market and with many
vacancies, an additional wage increase will come on top
of the collectively agreed wage increase with a transition
from the old to the new job. The paper investigates this
hypothesis by estimating the inﬂuence of labour ﬂows on
wage drift in various empirical speciﬁcations. The contents
of the paper is as follows. Section II provides some theor-
etical justiﬁcation why labour ﬂows may have an inﬂuence
on wage drift. Section III discusses the data used in our
empirical analysis in section IV. Finally, Section V draws
some conclusions.
II . THEORY
Although wage drift has been the subject of research during
a long time (see e.g. Hansen en Rehn, 1956), only recently
have modern labour market theories been applied to
explain wage drift. In the traditional studies of wage for-
mation, speciﬁed either as a Phillips curve or a wage curve
(Graaﬂand 1992, Blanchﬂower and Oswald 1992, Lever
1991) the unemployment rate or a transformation thereof
constitutes the main determinant of real wage changes. The
policy debate concentrated on the question whether the
trade-oﬀ of between wage inﬂation and unemployment
could be used for cyclical policy.
An early model explaining wage drift is developed by
Holmlund (1986). This model, with implicit negotiations
between trade unions and employers, focuses on the rela-
tionship between the wage drift and the collectively agreed
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wages. Because of the counter cyclical labour market policy
of the government, which the negotiating parties antici-
pate, he asserts a negative correlation between wage drift
and the cycle. However, it seems more likely that this cor-
relation is positive, as in the model by Holden (1988), who
explicitly considers negotiations between trade unions and
employers on two levels. At the central level the national
trade union determines the wage according to the collective
agreement. Then, at the local level negotiations are con-
ducted about the wage drift. Given the resulting wages the
employers determine employment. Holden’s model
assumes perfect information in the negotiation process,
so that central wage agreements reckon with the outcomes
of the negotiations on the local level.
Muysken and Van Veen (1996) extend Holden’s model
with elements of eﬃciency wage theory. Whereas in
Holden’s model there is a threat of a conﬂict in the local
wage negotiation, Muysken and Van Veen make the eﬀort
of the workers and therefore the proﬁt of the ﬁrms depen-
dent upon their wages. In this way wage drift enhances, to
a certain level, the eﬃciency, and therefore the productivity
of the workers.
As yet, these models explaining wage drift do not take
the inﬂuence of labour market dynamics and job mobility
into account. However, the labour ﬂow approach to wage
drift can be incorporated into the eﬃciency wage theory.
In the case of labour ﬂows and job mobility the negotia-
tions are between individual workers and individual ﬁrms,
and are not conﬁned to one ﬁrm. When workers are look-
ing for a new job, either on their old job or when unem-
ployed, they will try to ﬁnd a job in a ﬁrm that oﬀers a
higher wage and, consequently, where they are more pro-
ductive. So this variant of the eﬃciency wage model
implies a positive relationship between wage drift and
job-to-job mobility, which will be tested in the empirical
analysis.
This explanation of the wage drift reveals a conundrum
in the way the so-called wage space is used in wage nego-
tiations in the Netherlands at the central level. The wage
space is equal to the sum of the inﬂation rate and pro-
ductivity growth. It used to be the starting point for the
trade unions in the wage negotiations. However, when
part of the productivity gains is connected with the
wage drift, there would be a kind of double counting
when collective wage agreements are based on the total
wage space. In fact the ﬁgure for the wage space for the
collective agreements at the central level should be cor-
rected for productivity increases which are related to job
mobility.
The above theoretical considerations relate to the part of
wage drift which can be attributed to labour market
dynamics. Of course, there are also institutional factors
which determine wage drift, such as promotions and age
related wage increases.
III . DATA ON WAGE DRIFT AND LABOUR
FLOWS
Up to now macro data on wage drift for The Netherlands
are only available on a yearly basis from the Central
Planning Bureau. These data relate to the so called ‘market
sector’ (i.e. excluding wages in the public and semi-public
sectors) and are derived from national accounts’ data. Here
wage drift is deﬁned as any wage increase that results from
causes other than the contract wage increase. So, apart
from the wage changes associated with labour market
dynamics, which are of interest to this paper, these data
include statistical deviations and changes in the character-
istics of the labour force (gender, age, education).
The data on labour ﬂows used in the empirical analysis
are constructed by means of a consistent accounting system
of administrative data (see Broersma et al. (2000) and
Kock (2000)).
IV. EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS
We have used a general-to-speciﬁc approach, starting from
a standard wage(drift) equation speciﬁcation (Graaﬂand
1992, Holden 1998). We have adapted this speciﬁcation
to include labour market ﬂow variables, resulting in:
d ¼ 0 þ 1X þ 2Pþ 3ðw aptÞ1 þ 4rw
þ 5Y þ 6Z
In this equation i represent the coeﬃcients, subscript 1
denotes one lagged period and d is the percentage change
in wage drift as dependent variable. X is a matrix of the
labour force characteristics gender and age. P represent a
matrix of price index variables that have been considered,
namely the consumer price index and two varieties of the
producer price index: sales and purchases.
Following Holden (1998) (w apt)1 has been included
as lagged, nominal wage growth corrected for an increase
in productivity. This variable indicates to what extent an
increase in productivity is reﬂected in the nominal wage
increase. The residual wage rw is a wage drift speciﬁc var-
iant of the wage space mentioned in Section II. This variant
equals the labour productivity growth minus the inﬂation-
corrected contract wage increase. It therefore indicates how
much room is left for negotiations at the micro-level to
further enhance individual wages beyond the contractually
deﬁned level in the central agreements. This variable is
expected to have a positive sign: the larger this residual
wage space, the more employers will be inclined to allow
individual wage increases.
Y represents a matrix of labour market ﬂow variables
and is, therefore, the focus of our empirical analysis. In
the general to speciﬁc approach four alternative ﬂow vari-
ables were selected, namely two labour ﬂows Fe, which is
job-to-job movement and should have a positive sign, and
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Fi which is the ratio of the number of employees entering
the labour force and those leaving it, which should have a
negative sign at the aggregate level. Here it is assumed that
those entering the labour force are less productive than
those leaving the labour force, because of age and, may
be, due to loss of human capital during unemployment.
Also included in Y are two job ﬂows, Fjc being the number
of created jobs and Fjd the number of destroyed jobs. For
these variables a positive and a negative sign are expected
respectively. Finally, Z is a matrix of traditional indicators
of labour market tightness that has been experimented
with, namely vacancy and unemployment rates.
Table 1 gives the results of four alternative speciﬁcations
of the wage drift equation. Judged to economic interpret-
ation and goodness of ﬁt regression (4) would be preferred.
It appeared that none of the labour force characteristics
performed well in any of the regressions, so that they
were left out of the preferred estimations. The consumer
price index performed better than the producer price
indices in all regressions. It was only signiﬁcant in regres-
sion (1), as that regression contains the nominal variant of
the residual wage space.
The lagged term ðw aptÞ1 representing the wage
growth corrected for productivity in the previous year
shows up with a positive coeﬃcient. An increase of one
percentage point in this variable results in an increase of
0.17 percentage point in the wage drift, while the relevant
elasticity equals 0.25. It indicates that there is some per-
sistence in the eﬀect of labour market conditions on wage
drift. The residual wage space rw appears to be an im-
portant explanatory variable in the regressions. If rw
increases by one percentage point, the wage drift will
rise by 0.26 percentage point. This result shows that
employers take the outcome of central negotiations into
account when bargaining with employees on wage drift. It
supports the view that the contract wage and wage drift
are communicating vessels to some extent (Van der Wiel
1998, 1999).
The coeﬃcients for the labour and job ﬂow variables are
all signiﬁcant, yet their values are relatively small. If job-to-
job movement Fe in t 1 increased by 1%, then wage drift
will increase by 0.016% in period t. It is interesting to
notice that this relation can only be obtained for lagged
job-to-job movement: contemporaneous job-to-job mobi-
lity is uncorrelated with wage drift. It may be that employ-
ers only let new employees share in their increased
productivity after a trial period. The lag may also have
an institutional background. When bargaining, employers
and employees can only know data from previous periods
with relative certainty. When the ratio of people entering
and leaving the labour force Fi decreases one percentage
point the wage drift increases with 0.07 percentage points.
This eﬀect of a relative increase of new entrants to the
labour market on wage drift is therefore the largest of
the dynamic labour market variables of the model. The
eﬀect of creation of new jobs Fjc on wage drift appears
to be small, as a 1% increase in the number of newly cre-
ated jobs results in an increase of wage drift of only 0.03%.
Job destruction Fjd does not appear to have a role in the
explanation of wage drift growth. Of the static labour mar-
ket indicators the percentage change in the number of
vacancies performed best. Its inﬂuence on wage drift is
also limited, as the elasticity is only 0.03. Yet, in spite of
these limited eﬀects in a quantitative sense, it is noted that
in our speciﬁcation (4) in Table 1 almost all explanatory
variables obtain the expected signs and are signiﬁcant.
V. CONCLUSIONS
The empirical analysis of this paper, using macro-data for
The Netherlands for the period 1971–1997, shows that
labour ﬂows have some inﬂuence on wage drift in the mar-
ket sector, i.e. the part of wage changes other than con-
tractual wage increases. An inter ﬁrm eﬃciency wage model
may account for these eﬀects: ﬁrms would attract workers
from other ﬁrms by higher salaries when they can be more
productive in their new jobs. This will happen mainly in
good times: during periods with tight labour market con-
ditions and with much job creation.
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Table 1. OLS equations for wage drift
Observation period for equations (1), (2), (3):
1971–1997, for equation (4): 1972–1997
(1) (2) (3) (4)
CPI 0.217*
(2.56)
ðw aptÞ1 0.178* 0.169* 0.177* 0.174*
(2.98) (4.40) (4.68) (4.95)
rw 0.228* 0.256* 0.258*
(3.62) (3.80) (4.28)
ðapt qÞ 0.231*
(3.48)
Fe 0.005 0.005 0.012
(0.51) (0.55) (0.93)
Fe1 0.017* 0.016*
(2.09) (2.06)
Fi 0.062* 0.061* 0.085* 0.069*
(2.81) (2.87) (2.27) (3.26)
Fjc 0.044 0.029*
(1.29) (1.90)
Fjd 0.000
(0.00)
V 0.031* 0.031* 0.033* 0.027*
(3.10) (3.17) (3.26) (3.41)
Durbin Watson 2.27 2.25 2.20 2.17
Adj. R2 0.48 0.50 0.57 0.60
Standard error 0.63 0.62 0.57 0.55
Note: * indicates signiﬁcance at the 5% level, t-values between
parentheses.
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